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Abstract
Teamwork and cooperation between workers can be of substantial value to a firm, yet the
level of worker cooperation often varies between individual firms. We show that these
differences can be the result of labor market competition if workers have heterogeneous
preferences and preferences are private information. In our model there are two types
of workers: selfish workers who only respond to monetary incentives, and conditionally
cooperative workers who might voluntarily provide team work if their co-workers do
the same. We show that there is no pooling in equilibrium, and that workers self-select
into firms that differ in their incentives as well as their resulting level of team work.
Our model can explain why firms develop different corporate cultures in an ex-ante
symmetric environment. Moreover, the results show that, contrary to first intuition,
labor market competition does not destroy but may indeed foster within-firm cooperation.
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“Here you don’t communicate. And sometimes
you end up not knowing things. ... Everyone
says we need effective communication. But it’s
a low priority in action. ... The hardest thing
at the gates when flights are delayed is to get
information.”
Customer service supervisor,
American Airlines
“There is constant communication between ser-
vice and the ramp. When planes have to be
switched and bags must be moved, customer
service will advise the ramp directly or through
operations.” If there’s an aircraft swap “opera-
tions keeps everyone informed. ... It happens
smoothly.”
Customer service supervisor,
Southwest Airlines
1 Introduction
Teamwork, cooperation, and helpfulness between workers can be of substantial value to a
firm. There are many examples — workers with complementary skills can increase output
and productivity by helping each other on individual tasks. Similarly, communication and
the sharing of relevant information between different workers or work groups often greatly
enhance the efficiency of production. While cooperation between workers is beneficial to the
firm, the exertion of cooperative effort is usually costly to a worker. Moreover, it is typically
hard to identify, let alone to verify, whether or not a worker helped a co-worker or shared
information. Hence, incentives for cooperation are difficult to provide. Unless workers are
intrinsically motivated, firms therefore often face inefficiently low levels of worker cooperation.
However, both empirical evidence and carefully designed experiments suggest that workers
sometimes do cooperate and that a large part of this cooperation is driven by so-called
“conditional cooperation”, that is, a preference to cooperate conditional on the cooperation
of others.1 Could it be that the existence of conditional cooperators mitigates (or even solves)
1Cleanest evidence for conditional cooperation comes from laboratory experiments (Fischbacher, Ga¨chter,
and Fehr 2001, Ga¨chter and Tho¨ni 2005, Fischbacher and Ga¨chter 2006, Kosfeld, Fehr, and Weibull 2006). Frey
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the above described cooperation problem within firms? The answer is not immediately clear
since the same empirical evidence suggests that workers’ preferences are heterogeneous,
where a substantial fraction of workers reveal purely selfish behavior. In case cooperation is
efficient and labor markets are competitive, firms that employ cooperative workers should
pay high wages due to high output. This attracts selfish types. Consequently, it has been
conjectured in the literature (Lazear 1989, Kandel and Lazear 1992) that no separating
equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms can exist if preferences are private
information.2 Moreover, labor market competition should eventually erode all cooperation,
since conditionally cooperative workers will no longer voluntarily exert team effort in the
presence of selfish types.
While the above arguments are correct, we show in this paper that the conjecture is wrong.
We prove that workers in a competitive labor market with hidden information self-select
in equilibrium, thereby leading to the emergence of heterogeneous corporate cultures with
regard to teamwork and cooperation.
In a nutshell, our model runs as follows. There is a competitive labor market where firms
can employ teams of two workers and each worker chooses individual and team effort. Effort
is costly with marginal costs in both dimensions (individual effort and team effort) being an
increasing function of a worker’s effort in the other dimension. Firms can provide monetary
incentives for individual effort, but team effort is non-contractible. We assume that there
exist two types of workers: selfish workers and conditionally cooperative workers. A selfish
worker responds to monetary incentives and hence exerts individual effort only if monetary
incentives are sufficiently high. Since teamwork is non-contractible, a selfish worker never
exerts team effort. A conditionally cooperative worker also responds to monetary incentives
with respect to individual effort. However, he might also exert team effort in case his
co-worker cooperates as well. Types are private information, and firms offer wage contracts
and Meier (2004) and Heldt (2005) provide field evidence for conditional cooperation. A recent discussion of
the experimental work, also in view of policy implications, is given by Ga¨chter (2006). Empirical studies that
document conditional cooperation in real labor environments include Ichino and Maggi (2000) and Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul (2005).
2Lazear (1989) argues in a tournament setting where workers can be either cooperative (doves) or selfish
(hawks). He shows that types do not self-sort, concluding “that dovish firms should use personality as a hiring
criterion. Hawks will attempt to pass themselves off as doves, feigning a noncompetitive personality. It is
rational for dovish firm to limit the work force to genuine doves” (p571). Kandel and Lazear (1992) provide
similar arguments in a profit sharing model.
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without ex-ante information about the type of workers that are going to accept the contract.
Similarly, workers do not know ex-ante the type of their co-worker who accepts the same
contract. However, parties can form beliefs based on workers’ observed acceptance decisions.
We model competition between firms using the notion of a competitive equilibrium under
adverse selection of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We extend their equilibrium concept
to account for workers’ effort choices by requiring workers to play a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium within firms.
We derive the following results. First, there is no pooling of workers in equilibrium, meaning
that different types of workers are never employed in the same firm. The reason is that a
conditional cooperator in a pooling contract correctly believes his colleague to be selfish
with strictly positive probability. It is then possible to skim off conditionally cooperative
workers with a contract that specifies a slightly lower monetary payoff. Selfish workers are
exclusively interested in their wage, thus they never accept this newly offered contract. Yet,
conditionally cooperative workers might be attracted since they can then be sure to be
matched with a conditional cooperator who also exerts team effort. Hence, there can be no
pooling, and workers self-select into different firms in any equilibrium. Second, we show that
firms offer two different types of contracts in equilibrium: selfish contracts and constrained
cooperative contracts. Selfish contracts provide strong monetary incentives for individual
effort and are accepted by selfish workers. No teamwork is observed in firms offering these
contracts, and firms make zero profit in equilibrium. Constrained cooperative contracts are
exclusively accepted by conditional cooperators, who provide team effort in equilibrium.
Whether conditional cooperators also provide individual effort depends on the monetary
incentives the firm offers. If individual effort is relatively important to the firm, constrained
cooperative contracts provide high monetary incentives and workers exert both individual
and team effort. Because contracts account for the fact that individual effort is more costly
for workers who also provide team effort, monetary incentives in this situation are, in fact,
higher than monetary incentives for selfish workers. Yet, as team work becomes more
important, constrained cooperative contracts reduce monetary incentives and pay only a
fixed wage, thereby inducing conditional cooperators to provide teamwork but no individual
effort. The reason is that unlike selfish workers, conditionally cooperative workers then also
save on the cost of providing team effort. Independent of which case applies, firms offering
a constrained cooperative contract in a separating equilibrium always have to ensure that
selfish workers do not accept their contract. Depending on the situation, this may imply
that a firm cannot pay out all its profits to its workers: otherwise wage payments would be
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high enough to attract selfish workers. In consequence, constrained cooperative contracts
may yield positive profit in equilibrium.
Our model can explain a number of empirical findings. First, firms, even within the
same industry, often develop remarkably different corporate cultures. These cultures are
characterized, amongst others, by differences in the level of cooperation and team work
within firms. In the airline industry, for example, Southwest Airlines has become the
prototype of a strong cooperative corporate culture, where employees are known to help each
other and team spirit and good relationships between different work units play a key role
(Gittell 2000, Gittell 2003).3 In contrast to Southwest, most other U.S. airlines have been
unable to achieve similar levels of worker cooperation and have often been characterized by
a culture of conflict rather than cooperation (Gittell, von Nordenflycht, and Kochan 2004).
The findings are not unique to the airline industry. Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997),
e.g., report similar differences for the steel industry, documenting a strong heterogeneity in
human resource management practices (including team work, training, hiring, supervision,
etc.) in a sample of 36 U.S. production lines all of which operate in the same steel finishing
business. Second, firms that enjoy high levels of team work tend to be more productive
than firms without or with only low levels of team work. Southwest Airlines, for example,
announced its 31st consecutive year of profitability in 2004, which is a big achievement given
the high turbulence of the airline industry in the past decades.4 Ichniowski, Shaw, and
Prennushi (1997) find that production lines using innovative work practices, which include
high levels of team work, are significantly more productive than lines with the traditional
approach where team work does not play an important role. The positive impact of team
work on productivity is also confirmed by Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) who
analyze the effects of a “cultural change” from individual to team production in a U.S.
garment plant. Finally, high levels of cooperation seem to be associated with weak individual
incentives. Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebitzer (2007), for example, show in a U.S. random
sample of medical group practices that incentive pay reduces help activities among physicians
such as mutual consultations about cases. Consistent with this finding, Burks, Carpenter,
and Go¨tte (2006) show in a sample of Swiss and U.S. bicycle messenger companies that firms
that pay for performance employ significantly less cooperative workers than those that pay
hourly wages or are organized as cooperatives. Unlike the studies above which rely on firm
data, Burks et al. elicit workers’ preferences for cooperation in a controlled field experiment.
3See, e.g., the quotations at the beginning of the paper which are taken from Gittell (2003).
4Fortune magazine has even called Southwest “the most successful airline in history” (Brooker 2001).
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In the light of our model, the empirical findings can be explained as a consequence of labor
market competition with private information about workers’ preferences for cooperation.
By choosing different contracts workers in equilibrium self-select into different firms, thus
leading to heterogeneous corporate cultures of team work with corresponding differences in
incentives and firm productivity.
The paper adds to several strands of research. First, our model emphasizes the role of sep-
aration and self-selection in labor markets. Other papers have analyzed the possible sorting
of workers differing by skill (Kremer and Maskin 1996, Saint-Paul 2001, Grossmann 2005),
liability (Dam and Perez-Castrillo 2003), mission (Besley and Ghatak 2005), or by vision
(Van den Steen 2005b). To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to demonstrate
the endogenous separation of workers who differ with regard to their preference for cooper-
ation. Moreover, and in contrast to the papers above, firms in our model compete under
incomplete information about the type of worker accepting a particular contract. In this re-
spect, our model is related to a recent paper by Prendergast (forthcoming) who analyzes the
self-selection of biased bureaucrats under incomplete information. A main difference between
his model and ours is the fact that the selection of bureaucrats in Prendergast (forthcoming)
is likely to be bifurcated while separation in our model is always complete.5 Second, our
paper adds to the — still rather underdeveloped — economic literature on corporate culture.
Previous papers have argued that different corporate cultures are the result of coordination
(Kreps 1990), shared knowledge (Cre´mer 1993), asymmetric equilibria in the product market
(Hermalin 1994), differences in firms’ initial conditions (Rob and Zemsky 2002), or shared
beliefs (Van den Steen 2005a). We show that labor-market competition generates forces by
itself that sustain the heterogeneity of firms with regard to work organization and cultures
of cooperation. Finally, as firms hiring conditionally cooperative workers in our model some-
times provide weaker incentives than those that employ selfish workers, our results also offer
a rationale for the potential optimality of muted incentives. Unlike existing models, however
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002), muted incentives in our
setting are not directly driven by workers’ cost functions or by repeated interaction, but are
a result of competition under adverse selection.6
5A recent paper that analyzes labor market sorting in an experimental setting is Dohmen and Falk (2006).
6Our results are also related to the literature on non-profit/for-profit wage differentials. See, e.g., Handy
and Katz (1998) and Leete (2001) for recent discussions and empirical evidence. While we do not explicitly
study non-profit institutions, our model is consistent with the idea that workers self-select into different labor
market sectors due to their preference for non-pecuniary aspects of the occupation.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 contains the results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Our model of a competitive labor market under adverse selection is based on Rothschild and
Stiglitz’s (1976) analysis of the insurance market. In addition, we account for workers’ effort
choices by modeling the interaction between workers within firms as a Bayesian game. There
is the following sequence of actions. First, firms can simultaneously enter the market at
zero costs by offering a contract to a countably infinite number of workers. Second, workers
simultaneously choose among the set of offered contracts. Conditional on the contract chosen,
workers are assigned a corresponding firm and randomly matched into teams of two. In case
a worker decides not to accept any offered contract or remains unmatched, he earns an
outside-option utility normalized to zero. Third, workers in each team produce output by
simultaneously exerting effort. Finally, wages are paid and payoffs are realized. We next fill
in all the necessary details.
2.1 Workers and Firms
Let us start with team production. When matched into a team of two, worker i can produce
output by exerting a two-dimensional effort ei = (ei1, ei2). For simplicity, we assume that
effort is binary in both dimensions, ei1 ∈ {0, 1} and ei2 ∈ {0, 1}. The effort components ei1
and ei2 differ in the kind of output they produce. Whereas effort ei1 generates individually
attributable output, effort ei2 contributes to some joint production of the team. We call ei1
a worker’s individual effort and ei2 his team effort.
A key assumption in our model is that it is easier for a firm to provide monetary incentives
for individual effort as compared to team effort. By the very nature of team production
it may be difficult to identify who is responsible for what share of the team output. This
well-known free-rider problem complicates the provision of incentives. Further, team effort
and cooperation might also affect a firm’s performance indirectly, for example via informal
communication, mutual help on individual projects, or improvements in dimensions that are
more difficult to measure such as quality. The impact of team effort on output might then
perhaps be observable but hard to verify. Since the focus in this paper is on the adverse
selection rather than the moral hazard problem, we abstract from the underlying details
regarding the incentive provision problem. Instead, we simply assume that team effort is
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non-contractible. Individual effort, however, is observable, verifiable, and hence contractible.
A contract w then consists of two elements, a fixed wage wf and a bonus wb each worker
gets if and only if he exerts individual effort. Fixed wage and bonus are assumed to be
weakly positive. LetW denote the set of all possible contracts.
Firms sell output at a price normalized to one. Given contract w = (wb, wf ) and workers’
effort choices (ei,ej) let
pi (w, ei,ej) = f(ei1) + f(ej1) + 2 g(ei2, ej2)−
(
ei1wb + ej1wb + 2wf
)
(1)
describe the firm’s profit generated by the considered team. The term in brackets captures
the firm’s wage payments. In addition to his fixed wage, a worker receives the bonus if and
only if he exerts individual effort. The remaining three terms determine total team output.
The latter consists of the individual outputs f and the joint team production g per worker.
We set f(1) equal to some strictly positive constant F > 0 and normalize f(0) to zero. To
model effort complementarity in team production we set g equal to some strictly positive
constant G > 0 if and only if both workers provide team effort. For all other effort choices
we normalize g to zero. Firms can hire any number of teams. We assume that firms offer a
single contract that applies to all its teams. Firms maximize expected profit per team.
Our second key assumption is that workers differ in their willingness to contribute team
effort. There are two types: each worker is either selfish or conditionally cooperative. Selfish
workers never exert any team effort because effort is costly and entails no private benefits.
Conditionally cooperative workers, however, might contribute team effort if they believe their
team colleague to do the same. Let θ ∈ {s, c} denote a worker’s type. The utility of worker i
who is of type θ, chooses effort vector ei = (ei1, ei2), and is matched in a team with worker
j who exerts effort ej is defined as
uiθ(w, ei,ej) =
 wbei1 + wf − ψ(ei1, ei2) if θ = s,wbei1 + wf − ψ(ei1, ei2) + γ(ei2, ej2) if θ = c. (2)
Worker i’s utility consists of up to three components. First, he enjoys utility wbei1+wf from
his wage. Second, exerting effort causes him effort costs ψ(ei1, ei2). The cost function ψ is
weakly positive and strictly increasing in both effort dimensions. We assume that individual
and team effort are substitutes in a worker’s cost function, i.e., marginal costs of effort in one
dimension are an increasing function of effort in the other dimension. Normalizing ψ(0, 0) to
zero, this implies
ψ(1, 1) > ψ(1, 0) + ψ(0, 1). (3)
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Third, conditionally cooperative workers enjoy some intrinsic satisfaction γ(ei2, ej2) from
cooperation. To model conditional cooperation, we set γ equal to some strictly positive
constant Γ > 0 if and only if both workers contribute team effort. For all other effort
choices γ is normalized to zero. The assumption that conditionally cooperative workers
enjoy some intrinsic satisfaction from joint cooperation is consistent with Rabin’s (1993)
model of fairness. Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) provide empirical evidence for
the hypothesis that some workers receive intrinsic satisfaction from team work. Analyzing
team participation in a garment plant, they find that “some workers joined teams despite
an absolute decrease in pay, suggesting that teams offer nonpecuniary benefits to workers”
(p.469).7 We assume that workers’ types are private information, yet it is common knowledge
that they are independently distributed with each worker being conditionally cooperative
with some prior probability λ ∈]0, 1[. Both types of workers maximize expected utility.
Finally, we make the following assumptions with regard to the efficiency of individual effort
and team effort. First, we assume that
F > ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1) (4)
which ensures that marginal output always exceeds marginal costs of individual effort. Hence,
exerting individual effort is always efficient. Second, we assume that
Γ > ψ(1, 1)− ψ(1, 0). (5)
Workers’ benefit from exerting team effort exceeds their marginal effort costs even if individual
effort is chosen. Because of the intrinsic satisfaction Γ from successful cooperation, team
production is thus always efficient in a team of conditionally cooperative workers, independent
of team output G.
2.2 Equilibrium Behavior
The objective of our paper is to investigate whether labor market competition can lead to
a separation of workers according to their type, whether conditionally cooperative workers
cooperate in equilibrium, and whether, thus, heterogeneous corporate cultures can emerge in
an ex-ante symmetric environment. To answer these questions we follow the tradition in the
literature of competition under adverse selection and analyze the equilibrium set of offered
contracts, abstracting from the identity and the explicit decision making of individual firms.
7The assumption is also supported by numerous studies from organizational psychology. See, e.g., Tyler
and Blader (2000) and Organ, Podsakoff, and MacKenzie (2006) for an overview.
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At the same time, we model workers’ interactive behavior within firms as a Bayesian game.
As in other models of adverse selection, workers’ contract choices might reveal informa-
tion on their preferences. We assume that beliefs do not differ across individuals. Let
µ(θ|w,W ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with which firms and all other workers believe
a worker to be of type θ ∈ {s, c} if the latter accepts contract w out of a set of offered
contracts W. We require that individuals form such beliefs for all contracts w ∈W and all
possible sets of offered contracts W ⊆W .
To describe workers’ behavior let aiθ(w,W ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the type-dependent probability
with which worker i accepts contract w out of a set of offered contracts W. Equally, let
eiθ(w,W ) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} denote worker i’s type-dependent effort choice given he is
assigned a team within a firm that employs contract w from a set of offered contracts W.
We require workers to have fully specified strategies that determine type-dependent behavior
for all contracts w ∈ W and all possible sets W ⊆ W of offered contracts.8 We focus on
symmetric equilibria throughout the paper where all workers share the same type-dependent
equilibrium strategies, thus we skip subindices i, j in the following.
In a competitive equilibrium, we require workers’ strategies and beliefs to form a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium given all possible sets of offered contracts W ⊆ W . Details are
given in the appendix (Definition 1). Intuitively, workers behave optimally within a firm
if they maximize their expected utility given the firm’s contract, the equilibrium strategies
of the other workers, and the common beliefs. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, workers’
effort choices must form a Bayesian equilibrium in every subgame and thus for all possible
contracts w. Based on these equilibrium outcomes each worker computes his expected
utility upon accepting a particular contract and chooses the contract that maximizes his
utility over the set of offered contracts. Although preferences are private information,
contract choices might serve as a signal. Equilibrium beliefs are required to be consistent
with worker’s acceptance decisions and Bayes’ rule whenever this is possible. If a contract is
never accepted in equilibrium, beliefs are undetermined and can be set arbitrarily.
Given that workers behave optimally, a competitive equilibrium is a set of offered contracts
8In addition, we impose the following cutoff rules: whenever a worker is indifferent between exerting and
not exerting effort, he exerts effort; whenever a worker is indifferent between exerting only team effort and
exerting only individual effort, he exerts only individual effort.
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satisfying the following requirements (see Definition 2 in the appendix). First, the equi-
librium set of offered contracts contains no irrelevant contracts that are never accepted in
equilibrium. Second, no firm offers a contract that makes expected losses in equilibrium.
Otherwise, the firm could increase its expected profit by withdrawing the offered contract.
Third, since competition is modeled by free entry a set of offered contract forms an
equilibrium only if no firm can enter the market by offering a new contract that attracts
workers and yields non-negative expected profit.
Note that a competitive equilibrium has the following properties. Since firms can employ
any number of teams, there is no rationing. Because there is an infinite number of workers,
workers in a symmetric equilibrium can be sure to find a co-worker when accepting a
contract that is optimally accepted with strictly positive probability. Consequently, all
workers of the same type receive the same equilibrium utility. Let u∗θ denote the equilibrium
utility of a type-θ worker. We call a competitive equilibrium a separating equilibrium if there
exists no offered contract that is accepted with strictly positive probability by both types
of workers. A worker’s type can then perfectly be inferred from his contract choice. In all
other equilibria there exists at least one contract that is accepted by both types of workers
with strictly positive probability. In this case we say that there is pooling in equilibrium.
Whether a set W ∗ of contracts can be supported as a competitive equilibrium depends on
workers’ reaction towards a newly offered contract w′ 6∈W ∗. This reaction in turn depends
on workers’ beliefs upon accepting the new contract, on the Bayesian equilibria they expect
to be played within firms, and on whether they expect to find a colleague. As common in
screening and signalling models, there exist multiple equilibria that are based on particular
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Further, there can arise coordination problems concerning the
Bayesian equilibria within firms and workers’ acceptance decisions. To rule out implausible
competitive equilibria we employ the following equilibrium refinements.9 First, we apply
Cho and Kreps’s (1987) intuitive criterion requiring that workers do not believe a worker
accepting a new contract to be of a particular type if this type will always get strictly
less than his equilibrium utility while the other type might get weakly more (Refinement 1).
Second, suppose that workers believe that a new contract might only be accepted by a certain
type and that acceptance is only optimal for this type if a particular Bayesian equilibrium is
played within the firm. Then we assume that workers accepting the new contract successfully
9Again, details are provided in the appendix.
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coordinate on that equilibrium (Refinement 2).10 Finally, we rule out that workers do not
accept a new contract yielding a higher expected utility only because they expect no other
worker to accept this contract, and thus expect utility zero since they are not matched with
another worker (Refinement 3).
3 Results
In this section, we proceed as follows. We first analyze the set of Bayesian equilibria within
firms, that is, the set of Bayesian equilibria in all possible subgames which are defined by
a particular contract and a particular belief about the co-worker’s type. We then explore
the competitive equilibria in our model. In particular, we show that no pooling can arise in
equilibrium, we characterize the set of Pareto-efficient separating contracts, and we prove ex-
istence of a separating equilibrium. Finally, we compare our results under private information
to the benchmark case where preferences are observable.
3.1 Bayesian Equilibria within Firms
Consider a Bayesian game within a firm that is characterized by a particular contract and
corresponding beliefs about the co-worker’s type. We restrict attention to equilibria in pure
strategies. By definition, conditionally cooperative workers exert no team effort if they expect
their co-worker not to exert team effort. This behavior can generate multiple equilibria:
selfish equilibria, in which no type of worker cooperates, and cooperative equilibria, in which
the conditionally cooperative workers contribute team effort. Concerning selfish equilibria
we get the following result.
Lemma 1 (Selfish Equilibrium) Consider the Bayesian game given by contract w ∈ W
and beliefs µ(θ|w,W ) for θ ∈ {s, c}. There always exists a selfish equilibrium in which there
is no cooperation and
eSEθ (w,W ) =
 (0, 0) if wb < ψ(1, 0)(1, 0) if wb ≥ ψ(1, 0) (6)
describes the equilibrium effort choices of both types of workers θ ∈ {s, c}.
The simple proof is left to the reader. Since a conditionally cooperative worker in a selfish
equilibrium correctly anticipates that his co-worker never contributes team effort, the same
is optimal for him. Given that there is no cooperation, selfish and conditionally cooperative
10Refinement 2 is related to the forward induction argument of van Damme (1989).
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workers have the same utility function. Consequently, both types of workers exert individual
effort if the bonus exceeds the associated increase in their effort costs. The following lemma
shows that there also exists a cooperative equilibrium depending on workers’ beliefs.
Lemma 2 (Cooperative Equilibrium) Consider the Bayesian game given by contract
w ∈ W and beliefs µ(θ|w,W ) for θ ∈ {s, c}. There exists a cooperative equilibrium in
which the conditionally cooperative workers exert team effort if and only if
µ(c|w,W ) ≥

ψ(0, 1) /Γ if wb < ψ(1, 0)(
ψ(0, 1) + wb − ψ(1, 0)
)
/Γ if wb ∈
[
ψ(1, 0), ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1)[(
ψ(1, 1)− ψ(1, 0))/Γ if wb ≥ ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1).
(7)
In such a cooperative equilibrium, selfish workers choose the same efforts eSEs (w,W ) as in
the selfish equilibrium, whereas
eCEc (w,W ) =
 (0, 1) if wb < ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1)(1, 1) if wb ≥ ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1) (8)
describes the equilibrium effort choices of the conditionally cooperative workers.
All proofs can be found in the appendix. Whether a cooperative equilibrium exists
depends on the workers’ belief. If a conditional cooperator believes that a conditionally
cooperative colleague exerts team effort, exerting team effort increases his expected utility
by µ(c|w,W ) Γ. If this expected benefit of cooperation exceeds the associated effort costs,
there exists a cooperative equilibrium. Yet the costs of contributing team effort depend on
the individual effort choice, which in turn depends on the contract. Given a high bonus,
conditionally cooperative workers exert individual effort. Since individual effort and team
effort are substitutes in the worker’s cost function, this makes the contribution of team effort
more costly. Individual incentives thus render the conditions on the belief for the existence
of a cooperative equilibrium more restrictive. In this sense, high incentives can crowd-out
cooperation as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
However, team effort is efficient. Condition (5) ensures that for every contract there always
exists a cooperative equilibrium if workers believe their colleagues to be conditionally coop-
erative with probability one. Further, workers’ effort costs imply that the minimum bonus
needed to implement individual effort by conditional cooperators in a cooperative equilib-
rium is strictly higher than the corresponding minimum bonus in a selfish equilibrium. Since
conditional cooperators provide team effort in equilibrium, they need stronger incentives for
individual effort than selfish workers who do not cooperate and thus save on effort costs.
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3.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Having characterized the Bayesian equilibria within firms, we now introduce competition
between firms. By assumptions (4) and (5) exerting both individual and team effort is
efficient. Therefore, the best that can happen to a conditionally cooperative worker in a
competitive equilibrium is to join a firm that implements individual effort, pays out all profit
to its’ workers, and attracts only conditionally cooperative workers who coordinate on the
cooperative equilibrium. It is helpful for our analysis to describe the set of contracts that
maximize a conditionally cooperative worker’s utility given these constraints. By Lemma 2
the set is equal to
W c =
{
w ∈W : wb ∈ [ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1), F +G ] and wf = F +G− wb
}
. (9)
Superscript c stands for optimal cooperative contract.
We can now formulate our first result.
Proposition 1 (No Pooling) Suppose workers’ preferences are private information. Then
in any competitive equilibrium there is no pooling.
Proposition 1 is based on the following intuition. In most cases, firms can skim off
conditionally cooperative workers by offering a new contract. The reason is that pooling
is not very attractive for conditional cooperators: either the presence of selfish workers
destroys cooperation, or conditionally cooperative workers do not benefit from their team
effort with the probability µ(s|w,W ) with which their respective colleague is selfish. A
new firm can then enter the market and skim off the conditionally cooperative workers
by offering a contract that promises a slightly lower monetary payoff. Since they get less
pay under the new contract, selfish workers stick to the old contract. By Refinement
1 conditionally cooperative workers can thus be sure to be among their own type when
accepting the newly offered contract. Further, the new contract can be chosen such that by
Refinement 2 conditionally cooperative workers coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium
upon accepting the new contract. Since their team effort is now never wasted on a selfish
colleague, the associated increase in their expected benefit from cooperation overcompensates
their monetary loss. Consequently, firms can enter the market and attract conditionally
cooperative workers. Since wages are low they thereby incur no losses.
While it is typically the conditionally cooperative type that can be attracted by a newly
offered contract, we show in the proof of Proposition 1 that, in fact, there also exists a case
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where firms can skim off the selfish type. This happens when the pooling contract specifies
an intermediate bonus and workers coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium such that
only selfish workers exert individual effort. If expected team production by the conditionally
cooperative workers does not cover the fixed wages, the conditionally cooperative workers
are subsidized by the selfish workers in this case. New firms can then enter the market and
skim off selfish workers by offering a contract which implements high individual effort, pays
out all profit, and thereby grants the selfish workers the subsidy which previously went to
the conditionally cooperative workers.
Proposition 1 implies that any competitive equilibrium must be a separating equilibrium.
We will show that, as in other models of competition under adverse selection, our refinements
ensure that the only candidate for an equilibrium is Pareto-efficient: conditional on all firms
making at least zero profit, selfish workers receive contracts that maximize their utility,
whereas conditionally cooperative workers receive contracts that maximize their utility
without attracting selfish workers.11
First, consider the selfish workers. In a separating equilibrium selfish workers cannot free-ride
on the cooperation of conditional cooperators. The best that can happen to a selfish worker
is thus to join a firm that implements individual effort and pays out the entire profit F to
each worker. Lemma 1 then implies that
W s =
{
w ∈W : wb ∈ [ψ(1, 0), F ] and wf = F − wb
}
(10)
is the set of contracts that maximize a selfish worker’s utility in any competitive equilibrium.
Superscript s stands for optimal selfish contract.
Second, consider the conditionally cooperative workers. Suppose the selfish workers get at
least one contract from the set W s. We want to characterize the set W cc of contracts that
maximize the conditionally cooperative workers’ utility, given that the firms offering these
contracts make at least zero profit and are not infiltrated by selfish workers. Superscript
cc stands for constrained optimal cooperative contract. By (5) the conditionally cooperative
workers’ intrinsic benefit from cooperation exceeds their additional effort costs, if they can be
sure that their colleague also exerts team effort. In a competitive equilibrium, they should —
and we will show that they do — thus coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium. Contracts
11We show in the formal proof that the incentive constraint of the conditionally cooperative workers can
indeed be ignored.
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in W cc must therefore satisfy the following constraints,
F
(
eCEc1 (w,W )
)
+G ≥ wb eCEc1 (w,W ) + wf (11)
F − ψ(1, 0) ≥ wb eSEs1 (w,W ) + wf − ψ
(
eSEs1 (w,W ), 0
)
. (12)
The zero profit constraint (11) ensures that the firms make no losses in equilibrium, and (12)
is the incentive constraint of the selfish workers. We get the following result.
Lemma 3 (Optimal Screening Contracts) W cc is the set of contracts such that
(i) if G ≤ F − ψ(1, 1) + ψ(0, 1), then wb ∈ [ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1), F ] and wf = F − wb,
(ii) if G ∈ [F − ψ(1, 1) + ψ(0, 1), F − ψ(1, 0)], then wb < ψ(1, 0) and wf = G, and
(iii) if G > F − ψ(1, 0), then wb < ψ(1, 0) and wf = F − ψ(1, 0).
Moreover, suppose the above contracts are only accepted by conditionally cooperative workers
and these workers coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium. Then these contracts generate
a strictly positive expected profit unless G ∈ [F − ψ(1, 1) + ψ(0, 1), F − ψ(1, 0)].
Lemma 3 is illustrated in Figure 1 by mapping a conditionally cooperative worker’s
equilibrium utility uCEc under a constrained optimal cooperative contract as a function
of per-worker team output G. Although contracts cannot condition on G, the latter is
important as it determines whether or not the optimal screening contract implements
individual effort of the conditionally cooperative types.
In general, conditionally cooperative workers want to earn a high monetary payoff. In
case per-worker team output is small, G < F − ψ(1, 1, ) + ψ(0, 1), the constrained optimal
cooperative contract implements individual effort as otherwise output would be too small to
pay out high wages. However, conditionally cooperative workers contribute team effort to get
the intrinsic benefit from cooperation. They thereby produce additional output per worker.
Paying out this additional output is not incentive compatible as otherwise selfish workers
are attracted by the high wages. This implies that if conditionally cooperative workers are
to exert individual effort, they cannot benefit from their team effort other than by their
intrinsic satisfaction from cooperation. In consequence, they earn a utility F + Γ− ψ(1, 1).
Now suppose that per-worker team output G is intermediate but still smaller than F−ψ(1, 0).
If conditional cooperators are to exert only team effort, the firm can pay out all output to
each worker without violating the selfish workers’ incentive constraint. Since conditionally
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Utility of Conditionally Cooperative Workers
cooperative workers exert no individual effort, they incur no costs from individual effort. In
addition, they save on their costs from cooperation. Selfish workers who infiltrate cooperative
firms do not enjoy this additional cost reduction since they never exert team effort. By
reducing monetary incentives, firms can thus pass on this additional cost reduction to the
conditionally cooperative workers without violating the selfish workers’ incentive constraint.
If this additional cost reduction exceeds the loss in wages, i.e. ψ(1, 1)−ψ(0, 1) > F −G, it is
optimal not to implement individual effort. Conditionally cooperative workers then provide
only team effort and earn a utility G + Γ − ψ(0, 1). Finally, as per-worker team output G
exceeds the threshold F − ψ(1, 0), the selfish workers’ incentive constraint becomes binding
again. Therefore, firms cannot increase wages of the conditional cooperative workers any
further. The latters’ utility is capped at F − ψ(1, 0) + Γ− ψ(0, 1).
Lemma 3 shows that firms offering contracts in W cc might make strictly positive expected
profit. The reason for this result is the incentive constraint: whenever it binds the respective
firms cannot pay out all profit without attracting selfish workers. As seen above, the incentive
constraint is binding whenever contracts in W cc implement both team effort and individual
effort, or when contracts in W cc implement only team effort but G is sufficiently large.
Building on our findings sofar, we can now present our main result.
Proposition 2 (Competitive Equilibrium) Suppose workers’ preferences are private
information. Then in any competitive equilibrium W ∗
(i) workers of different types self-select into different firms,
16
(ii) W ∗ ⊆W s ∪W cc where W ∗ contains at least one element of W s and of W cc,
(iii) conditionally cooperative workers exert team effort, and
(iv) firms attracting the conditionally cooperative workers make strictly positive expected
profit unless G ∈ [F − ψ(1, 1) + ψ(0, 1), F − ψ(1, 0)].
Proposition 2 is based on the following intuition. Since there can be no pooling, workers
self-select into different firms. As a consequence, contracts from the set W s maximize
selfish workers’ utility. At least one of these optimal selfish contracts must be offered in
equilibrium. If this was not the case, a new firm could attract selfish workers by offering
an optimal selfish contract. If this contract also specifies a high bonus, it makes at least
zero profit since workers of any type exert individual effort upon acceptance. Given selfish
workers get an optimal selfish contract, at least one contract from the setW cc of constrained
optimal cooperative contract must be offered in equilibrium. Otherwise, a firm could attract
conditionally cooperative workers by offering a contract that is optimally accepted only by
conditionally cooperative workers who expect to coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium.
Our equilibrium refinements ensure that offering such a contract is indeed profitable and can
attract workers.
At first sight it might seem puzzling that there can exist a competitive equilibrium in which
some firms make strictly positive profit whereas other firms just break even. Why do those
firms that make zero profit not imitate the more profitable firms? It might appear that
our abstraction from firm identity and explicit profit maximization drives this result. This
is not the case. If firm identity matters, workers must condition their acceptance decisions
not only on the contract a firm offers, but also on the firm’s identity. If a new firm offers
a contract that is already offered by another firm, workers cannot increase their utility by
switching to the new firm. Consequently, optimal acceptance decisions can be chosen such
that the new firm cannot attract workers unless it promises them a strictly higher utility.12
In equilibrium, imitating the most successful firms is thus no profitable option. Yet due to
asymmetric information, paying a higher wage is not possible without attracting the selfish
workers and thus making losses. The same argument holds concerning firms that are already
active on the market but want to change the contract they provide.
12For example, suppose that firms are numbered consecutively. Then, workers behave optimally if they
always accept their best expected contract and in case of indifference choose the firm with the lowest number.
17
Before further commenting on the above characterized equilibrium properties, we must check
whether such competitive equilibria do exist. The literature following Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) has shown that Pareto-efficient separating equilibria in competitive markets with ad-
verse selection might be upset by pooling contracts. Our next result demonstrates that this
is not the case in our setting.
Proposition 3 (Existence) Suppose workers’ preferences are private information. Then
there always exists a competitive equilibrium as characterized in Proposition 2.
The existence result is based on the following intuition. In our model the utility a worker
expects when accepting a particular contract depends on the expected effort choices of his
colleague. These effort choices might depend on the colleague’s type. Contrary to standard
screening models, the workers’ acceptance and effort decisions thus depend on their beliefs
and the Bayesian equilibria they expect to be played within firms. Since by definition a
pooling contract can attract both types of workers, Refinement 1 cannot restrict beliefs.
Depending on the newly offered pooling contract, there are two cases.
First, the pooling contract might promise very high wages such that both types of workers
are attracted, no matter what Bayesian equilibrium they expect to be played. Refinement 3
and the consistency of beliefs then implies that workers hold the prior belief upon accepting
the newly offered contract. Given this belief there always exists the selfish equilibrium. Since
the acceptance decision is independent of what equilibrium the workers expect to be played,
Refinement 2 has no bite. Consequently, workers may coordinate on the selfish equilibrium
upon accepting the newly offered contract. But then the newly offered contract must make
expected losses as otherwise the conditionally cooperative workers cannot be attracted.
Second, the pooling contract might attract the conditionally cooperative workers only if they
expect the cooperative equilibrium to be played. Yet suppose workers believe that only selfish
workers accept the newly offered contract. Again, this belief cannot be not ruled out by our
refinement since both types of workers can be attracted by the pooling contract. Given this
belief, however, only the selfish equilibrium exists. If workers expect the selfish equilibrium
to be played, it is indeed optimal for only the selfish workers to accept the newly offered
contract. Thus, beliefs, effort choices, and acceptance decisions are consistent. Yet, if only
selfish workers accept the newly offered contract, this contract is not a pooling contract. By
construction no separating contract can upset the Pareto-efficient separating equilibrium as
characterized in Proposition 2.
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3.3 Impact of Asymmetric Information
To investigate the impact of asymmetric information let us finally consider the benchmark
case of observable preferences. If preferences are not private information, firms can target
contracts at a particular type of workers. Incentive constraints can be thus ignored. This
has the following consequence.
Proposition 4 (Complete Information Equilibrium) Suppose workers’ preferences are
observable. Then in any competitive equilibrium W ∗
(i) W ∗ ⊆W s ∪W c where W ∗ contains at least one element of W s and of W c,
(ii) conditionally cooperative workers exert team effort, and
(iii) all firms make zero profit.
The formal proof is omitted since the arguments are identical to the proof of Proposition 2.
As before, conditionally cooperative workers do not want to work in firms attracting selfish
workers. If workers’ types are observable, the market thus splits into two, one market for
each type. With complete information incentives do not constrain competition. Thus, selfish
workers get at least one contract from W s whereas conditionally cooperative workers get at
least one contract from the set W c. Firms then make zero profit.
Proposition 4 highlights the importance of the incentive constraint. If there is asymmetric
information some firms might make strictly positive profit in a competitive equilibrium. Firms
would like to enter the market and attract conditionally cooperative workers by offering them
a larger share of the profit they produce. Yet, this is not incentive compatible: these new firms
would then also attract selfish workers. The latter never contribute team effort, thus no firm
can enter the market without making expected losses. Moreover, asymmetric information
can cause incentives to be muted in firms that attract the conditionally cooperative workers.
Workers do not like to work, but high individual effort is efficient even though it increases
the costs of cooperation. If preferences are observable, competition forces firms to pay out
all profit. It is then optimal for conditionally cooperative workers to join a firm that employs
very strong monetary incentives. However, if there is asymmetric information, the incentive
constraint of the selfish workers might not allow firms to pay out all profit. Conditionally
cooperative workers thus cannot reap all monetary benefits of their individual effort. Yet,
they enjoy an additional reduction in their effort costs if firms abstain from using strong
incentives. Competition ensures that firms pass on this additional cost reduction to the
conditionally cooperative workers. Incentives in cooperative firms can thus be muted.
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4 Conclusion
We analyze a competitive labor market with heterogeneous workers that differ with regard
to their intrinsic motivation for cooperation in teams. Some workers are willing to cooperate
if their co-worker cooperates as well (conditional cooperators). Others only follow monetary
incentives and never cooperate (selfish workers). A worker’s type is private information and
firms compete for workers by offering wage contracts that can provide monetary incentives
for individual effort but not for team effort. Our results show that there is no pooling in
equilibrium, but that workers endogenously sort into firms that differ from each other in
several dimensions. While selfish workers are employed in firms that offer strong monetary
incentives for individual effort and do not enjoy team work, conditionally cooperative workers
are employed in firms where teamwork is observed. Moreover, asymmetric information about
a worker’s type can cause monetary incentives to be muted in firms that employ conditional
cooperators.
The assumption of conditionally cooperative preferences is based on solid empirical evidence
showing that most cooperation observed in experiments and in the field is contingent on the
cooperation of others (Ga¨chter 2006). Interestingly, the sorting result in our model breaks
down once we assume that cooperation is unconditional, meaning that cooperative types
always produce team effort independent of their colleague’s behavior. The reason is that
unconditional cooperators cannot be attracted by non-pecuniary benefits of cooperation
since these workers cooperate anyway. Firms can only compete by paying a higher wage,
which renders sorting under private information impossible.
Our results show further that firms employing conditional cooperators can make positive
profits in equilibrium, whereas competition for selfish workers drives down profits of the
corresponding firms to zero. This is because wage contracts for conditional cooperators in
a separating equilibrium have to be sufficiently unattractive to selfish workers. Thus, firms
may be constrained from paying out their profits to the workers, since high wages would
lead selfish workers to invade the firm, cooperation would be destroyed, and the firm would
consequently incur losses. Imitation of optimal screening contracts by “selfish” firms cannot
affect profits either, in particular because workers won’t be attracted by offers not promising
them a higher utility. Of course, if workers’ types were identifiable, the equilibrium wage
of conditional cooperators would rise under competition. Therefore, our model suggests
that firms are likely to use additional screening techniques (such as personality tests) in the
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presence of positive profits, in order to better identify a worker’s type, due to competitive
pressure from conditional cooperators and new firms entering the market. However, as our
model shows, such screening techniques are not necessary per se to ensure separation, but
will be another consequence of labor market competition.
Our model provides an explanation for the emergence and stability of different corporate
cultures. Contrary to research in management science stressing the important role of lead-
ership with regard to corporate culture (Schein 2004), firms in our model develop different
cultures not because particular entrepreneurs create them, but because they are the outcome
of competition for workers with heterogeneous preferences. We do not consider these two
explanations to be contradictory but believe that they are, in fact, complements. Our model,
for example, is silent about which of the given firms will ultimately be a “cooperative” and
which will be a “selfish” firm. All firms have an equal ex-ante chance to develop each cor-
porate culture. It seems intuitive that it will be more likely that entrepreneurs who trust in
the motive of conditional cooperation will implement a culture of cooperation rather than
principals who believe that workers are selfish and do not provide effort without explicit
incentives.13 Similarly, our results show that competitive markets will not necessarily elimi-
nate a potential ex-ante heterogeneity of firms due to entrepreneurs with different beliefs and
attitudes. Competition can indeed foster firm heterogeneity, thereby providing a basis for
the survival of teamwork and cooperation within (some) firms.
13Falk and Kosfeld (2006) provide evidence for the heterogeneity of principals’ beliefs in a simple principal-
agent experiment. Their findings suggest that even in the absence of sorting principals’ beliefs can become
self-fulfilling prophecies that reinforce the emergence of corporate cultures.
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Appendix
Definition of Equilibrium and Refinements
Definition 1 (Workers’ Equilibrium Behavior) Workers behave optimally given a set
of offered contracts W ⊆ W if the corresponding beliefs µ and type-dependent strategies{
e∗θ, a
∗
θ
}
for θ ∈ {s, c} form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, i.e.,
(i) the type-dependent effort choice e∗θ(w,W ) maximizes a type-θ worker’s expected utility
Eθ′uθ
(
w,e∗θ(w,W ),e
∗
θ′(w,W )
)
given beliefs µ(θ′|w,W ),
(ii) the type-dependent acceptance decision a∗θ(w,W ) maximizes a type-θ worker’s expected
utility over the set of offered contractsW given the outcomes as implied by the behavior
characterized in (i), and
(iii) the beliefs µ(θ|w,W ) for θ ∈ {s, c} are consistent with workers’ acceptance decisions
a∗θ(w,W ) and Bayes’ rule if the contract is accepted with strictly positive probability
a∗θ(w) > 0 by at least one type θ ∈ {s, c}.
Definition 2 (Competitive Equilibrium) Given that workers behave optimally for all
possible sets of offered contracts, a competitive equilibrium is a set of offered contracts W ∗
such that
(i) every contract w ∈W ∗ is accepted with strictly positive probability by at least one type
of worker, i.e., a∗θ(w,W
∗) > 0 for at least one type θ ∈ {s, c},
(ii) every contract w ∈ W ∗ generates non-negative expected profit given the equilibrium
beliefs µ(θ|w,W ∗) and workers’ type-dependent equilibrium effort choices e∗θ(w,W ∗)
for both types θ ∈ {s, c}, and
(iii) no contract w′ /∈ W ∗ can attract workers, i.e., there exists no w′ /∈ W ∗ such that
a∗θ(w
′,W ∗∪w′) > 0 for at least one type θ ∈ {s, c} and w′ yields non-negative expected
profit given the beliefs µ(θ|w′,W ∗ ∪ w′) and workers’ type-dependent effort choices
e∗θ(w
′,W ∗ ∪w′) for both types θ ∈ {s, c}.
Refinement 1 (Beliefs) Consider a competitive equilibrium W ∗ and suppose an additional
contract w′ 6∈W ∗ is offered. Suppose further that u∗θ > max(e,e˜)
{
uθ(w′, e, e˜)
}
for all (e, e˜)
and uθ′(w′,e, e˜) ≥ u∗θ′ for some (e, e˜) with θ 6= θ′. Then µ(θ|w′,W ∗ ∪w′) = 0.
Refinement 2 (Coordination) Consider a competitive equilibrium W ∗ and suppose an
additional contract w′ 6∈ W ∗ is offered. Further, suppose that µ(θ′|w′,W ∗ ∪ w′) = 1 and
22
that there exist unique equilibrium efforts e∗θ′ such that uθ′(w
′, e∗θ′ , e
∗
θ′) ≥ u∗θ′ given belief
µ(θ′|w′,W ∗ ∪w′) and contract w′. Then workers who accept contract w′ choose the equilib-
rium efforts e∗θ′.
Refinement 3 (Acceptance) Consider a competitive equilibrium W ∗ and suppose an
additional contract w′ 6∈W ∗ is offered. Given the corresponding beliefs and type-dependent
equilibrium effort choices, let uˆθ(w′) denote the expected utility of a type-θ worker who accepts
w′ and is matched in a team. Then
a∗θ(w
′,W ∗ ∪w′) =

1 if uˆθ(w′) > u∗θ,
∈ [0, 1] if uˆθ(w′) = u∗θ, and
0 if uˆθ(w′) < u∗θ.
for both types θ ∈ {s, c}.
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2
Selfish workers never exert team effort. A cooperative equilibrium thus exists if and only if
it is optimal for a conditionally cooperative worker to exert team effort given he expects his
conditionally cooperative colleague to exert team effort, as well. Given a contract w ∈ W
a worker believes with probability µ(c|w,W ) to be matched with a conditional cooperator.
There are two cases.
Case A) Suppose conditionally cooperative workers also exert individual effort in equilibrium.
They then get an expected utility wb + wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ − ψ(1, 1). Exerting team effort
forms an equilibrium if there are no profitable deviations. It is not profitable to exert only
team effort if and only if wb + wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ − ψ(1, 1) ≥ wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ − ψ(0, 1).
This condition is equivalent to wb ≥ ψ(1, 1) − ψ(0, 1). From the remaining devia-
tions, exerting only individual effort dominates exerting no effort at all if and only if
wb + wf − ψ(1, 0) ≥ wf . Due to assumption (3), this inequality is implied by the previous
condition on wb. However, exerting only individual effort is not profitable if and only if
wb +wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ−ψ(1, 1) ≥ wb +wf −ψ(1, 0). This yields the condition on the belief
µ(c|w,W ) for the case wb ≥ ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1).
Case B) Suppose conditionally cooperative workers only exert team effort in equilibrium.
They then get an expected utility wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ − ψ(0, 1). The imposed cutoff rule
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implies that conditionally cooperative workers do not exert both individual and team
effort if and only if wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ − ψ(0, 1) > wb + wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ − ψ(1, 1).
This yields the condition wb < ψ(1, 1) − ψ(0, 1) on the bonus. From the remaining two
deviations, exerting only individual effort dominates exerting no effort at all if and only
if wb + wf − ψ(1, 0) ≥ wf . If wb ∈
[
ψ(1, 0), ψ(1, 1) − ψ(0, 1)[, then the most attractive
remaining deviation is to exert only individual effort. It is then not profitable to deviate if
and only if wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ − ψ(0, 1) ≥ wb + wf − ψ(1, 0). If wb < ψ(1, 0), then the most
attractive remaining deviation is to exert no effort at all. It is then not profitable to deviate
if and only if wf + µ(c|w,W ) Γ − ψ(0, 1) ≥ wf . These inequalities yield the corresponding
conditions on the belief µ(c|w,W ) given the bonus wb. Q.E.D.
The following Lemma is of considerable help in our subsequent analysis. For notational
simplicity, we omit the dependency of a worker’s effort function on the set of offered contracts
whenever this is convenient.
Lemma 4 (Upsetting Equilibria) Suppose each worker’s type is private information.
Consider a set of offered contracts W ∗ generating utilities u∗c and u∗s under the assumption
that workers behave optimally given W ∗. Suppose there exists a contract w′ such that
uc
(
w′, eCEc (w
′), eCEc (w
′)
)
> u∗c > uc
(
w′,eSEc (w
′), eSEc (w
′)
)
, (13)
u∗s > us
(
w′, eSEs (w
′), ·), and (14)
pi
(
w, eCEc (w
′), eCEc (w
′)
) ≥ 0. (15)
Then W ∗ cannot form a competitive equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4
Given any contract a selfish worker’s utility depends exclusively on his own effort choice.
He maximizes his utility by choosing eSEs . By (14) it can thus never be optimal for selfish
workers to accept contract w′. Since by (13) this does not hold for conditionally cooperative
worker, Refinement 1 implies that µ(s|w′,W ∗∪w′) = 0. Given this belief and contract w′,
the cooperative equilibrium exists by Lemma 2 and inequality (5). Refinement 2 and (13)
imply that conditionally cooperative workers coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium upon
accepting w′. Refinement 3 with (13) and (14) then yield that a∗c(w′,W
∗∪ w′) = 1 and
a∗s(w′,W
∗∪ w′) = 0. These acceptance decisions are consistent with beliefs, and workers
accepting w′ can be sure to be matched into a team. Conditionally cooperative workers can
thus get more than u∗c by accepting w′. Therefore, w′ cannot be element of W
∗ given that
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workers choose the utility maximizing contract among the set of offered contracts. By (15)
contract w′ makes non-negative expected profit given the above refined beliefs and effort
choices. Since there thus exists a contract w′ /∈ W ∗ that attracts workers while generating
non-negative profit, W ∗ cannot form a competitive equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a competitive equilibrium W ∗. If there is pooling, there exists a contract w ∈W ∗
that is accepted by both types of workers. Contrary to selfish workers, conditionally coop-
erative workers might contribute team effort. As long as conditionally cooperative workers
exert as much individual effort as selfish workers, they thus produce weakly more output.
The latter is not the case if and only if wb ∈ [ψ(1, 0), ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1)[ and the conditionally
cooperative workers coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium. In this situation
µ(c|w,W ∗)(µ(c|w,W ∗)G− wf ) + µ(s|w,W ∗)(F − wb − wf ) (16)
describes the firm’s expected profit per worker. Note that a conditionally cooperative worker
produces team output only with the probability with which his colleague is also conditionally
cooperative. (16) implies that selfish workers subsidize conditionally cooperative workers in
a pooling equilibrium if and only if µ(c|w,W ∗)G < wf such that a conditionally cooperative
worker’s expected team output does not cover his fixed wage. The following proof is divided
into two parts depending on whether or not selfish workers subsidize conditionally cooperative
workers.
Part 1 (Skimming Off the Selfish Workers)
Suppose selfish workers subsidize conditionally cooperative workers. As argued above selfish
workers then exert individual effort. Since they then get both bonus and fixed wage, they
receive an equilibrium utility of u∗s = wb + wf − ψ(1, 0). Because conditionally cooperative
workers are subsidized, F > wb + wf must hold such that u∗s < F − ψ(1, 0).
Consider a new contract w′ with w′f = 0 and w
′
b = F . First, this contract cannot make losses
since it pays out F if and only if a worker exerts individual effort. Second, selfish workers
who accept w′ exert individual effort and get a utility of F −ψ(1, 0). Since this exceeds their
equilibrium utility, Refinement 3 implies that a∗s(w′,W
∗ ∪ w′) = 1 and workers accepting w
can be sure to be matched into a team. Thirdly, w′ cannot be offered in equilibrium since
otherwise the selfish workers’ equilibrium utility must exceed u∗s. Consequently, W
∗ cannot
form a competitive equilibrium.
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Part 2 (Skimming Off the Conditionally Cooperative Workers)
Suppose now that selfish workers do not subsidize conditionally cooperative workers. There
are two subcases.
Case A) Suppose workers coordinate on the selfish equilibrium after accepting w. In this
case, u∗s = u∗c . Since there is no cooperation and cooperation is efficient by inequality (5),
uc
(
w˜,eCEc (w˜), e
CE
c (w˜)
)
> u∗c for any contract w˜ ∈ W c. Furthermore, suppose contract w˜
is only accepted by conditionally cooperative workers who coordinate on the cooperative
equilibrium. Then w˜ generates zero profit as w˜ ∈W c. For the final part of this proof below
set w′ equal to w˜ ∈W c.
Case B) Suppose workers coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium after accepting w.
Because conditionally cooperative workers could mimic the selfish workers and thereby get
the same equilibrium utility, u∗c ≥ u∗s must hold. More precisely, conditionally cooperative
workers get an equilibrium utility of u∗c = wb eCEc1 (w) + wf + µ(c|w,W ∗) Γ − ψ
(
eCEc (w)
)
.
Pooling implies µ(c|w,W ∗) < 1 such that uc
(
w, eCEc (w), e
CE
c (w)
)
> u∗c . In this part of the
proof selfish workers do not subsidize conditionally cooperative workers. Thus, w generates
at least zero profit if it is accepted only by conditionally cooperative workers who then
coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium. For the final part of this proof set w′ equal to
the pooling contract w.
Given contract w′ as determined in Case A) and B) of this proof, consider another contract
w′′ which specifies the same bonus as w′ but pays out a fixed wage that is lower by some
² > 0. Contract w′′ implements the same effort choices in the cooperative equilibrium as w′
and thus generates at least zero profit if it is accepted only by conditionally cooperative
workers who then coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium. Further, ² can be set such that
uc
(
w′′, eCEc (w
′′), eCEc (w
′′)
)
> u∗c > uc
(
w′′, eSEc (w
′′), eSEc (w
′′)
)
. (17)
There are two cases concerning the selfish worker’s equilibrium utility. If u∗c = u∗s, then
the above inequality and the fact that uc
(
w′′, eSEc (w′′), ·
)
= us
(
w′′,eSEs (w′′), ·
)
yield u∗s >
us
(
w′′, eSEs (w′′), ·
)
. If u∗c > u∗s, then the considered situation is as captured by Part B).
Consequently, w′ = w such that ² > 0 yields u∗s = us
(
w′, eSEs (w′), ·
)
> us
(
w′′, eSEs (w′′), ·
)
.
In either case, Lemma 4 then implies thatW ∗ cannot form a competitive equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Whether or not conditionally cooperative workers are to exert individual effort in addition
to team effort determines the constrained optimal contracts. There are two cases.
Case A) Suppose w ∈ W cc implements both individual and team effort. Then the bonus
satisfies wb ≥ ψ(1, 1) − ψ(0, 1) by Lemma 2. Furthermore, the incentive constraint (12)
must be binding. The reason is the following. Suppose (12) was not binding. Then the
zero profit constraint (11) must be binding, since otherwise the firm could increase the
fixed wage wf and thus the utility of the conditionally cooperative workers. Inequality
wb ≥ ψ(1, 1)−ψ(0, 1) implies that wb > ψ(1, 0) by assumption (3). A selfish worker accepting
w thus exerts individual effort and gets a utility F +G− ψ(1, 0). Since G > 0, this violates
the incentive constraint (12). The binding incentive constraint now implies that wb+wf = F
such that F + Γ− ψ(1, 1) is the equilibrium utility of a conditionally cooperative worker.
Case B) Suppose w ∈W cc implements only team effort but no individual effort. Then the
bonus satisfies wb < ψ(1, 1)− ψ(0, 1) by Lemma 2. Since a conditionally cooperative worker
exerts no individual effort, he does not benefit from the bonus. Decreasing wb below ψ(1, 0)
has no impact on a conditional cooperator’s equilibrium utility, but softens the incentive
constraint (12). It is optimal to set wb < ψ(1, 0) such that a selfish worker accepting w
exerts no effort at all. The incentive constraint is then equivalent to wf ≤ F − ψ(1, 0). A
binding zero profit constraint (12) implies wf = G since the cooperative workers exert no
individual effort. There are two cases. If G ≤ F − ψ(1, 0), then the incentive constraint (12)
can be ignored and only the zero profit constraint is binding. This implies wf = G such that
G+ Γ− ψ(0, 1) is the equilibrium utility of the conditional cooperators. If G > F − ψ(1, 0),
then the incentive constraint is binding whereas the zero profit constraint can be ignored.
This implies wf = F − ψ(1, 0) such that F − ψ(1, 0) + Γ − ψ(0, 1) is the equilibrium utility
of the conditional cooperators.
Given the above cases, team output G determines whether the firm should implement
also individual effort or not. There are two subcases. First, suppose G > F − ψ(1, 0).
Conditional cooperators then get an equilibrium utility of F − ψ(1, 0) + Γ − ψ(0, 1) if
they are to exert no individual effort. Since ψ(1, 1) > ψ(1, 0) + ψ(0, 1), this equilibrium
utility exceeds the respective equilibrium utility F + Γ− ψ(1, 1) if conditionally cooperative
workers are to exert individual effort. It is thus always optimal not to implement individual
effort if G > F − ψ(1, 0). Second, suppose G ≤ F − ψ(1, 0). Conditional cooperators
27
then get an equilibrium utility G + Γ − ψ(0, 1) if they are to exert no individual effort.
If and only if G ≥ F − ψ(1, 1) + ψ(0, 1), this equilibrium utility exceeds the respective
equilibrium utility F + Γ − ψ(1, 1) conditionally cooperative workers receive if they are to
exert both individual and team effort. Therefore, it is optimal to implement individual
effort if G ≤ F −ψ(1, 1) +ψ(0, 1), whereas it is optimal not to implement individual effort if
G ∈ [F − ψ(1, 1) + ψ(0, 1), F − ψ(1, 0)]. This interval is nonempty by inequality (3).
Note that the incentive constraint for the conditionally cooperative workers can be ignored.
Since there is no cooperation, a conditionally cooperative worker who joins a firm that attracts
only selfish workers gets the selfish workers’ equilibrium utility F−ψ(1, 0). The above analysis
shows that the conditionally cooperative workers’ equilibrium utility is at least F+Γ−ψ(1, 1).
Since cooperation is efficient by inequality (5), conditionally cooperative workers thus have
no incentive to join a firm that attracts only selfish workers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, consider a separating equilibrium W ∗ that does not contain at least one element from
the setW s. Then there exists a contract w′ 6∈W ∗ with w′ ∈W s and w′b ≥ ψ(1, 1)−ψ(0, 1).
Since there is no pooling, contracts in W s maximize a selfish worker’s utility given firms
make nonnegative expected profit. Thus, us
(
w′, eSEs (w′), ·
)
> u∗s. Refinement 3 then implies
a∗s(w′,W
∗ ∪ w′) = 1 and workers who accept w′ can be sure to be matched into a team.
Consequently, contract w′ can attract selfish workers. Moreover, any worker accepting this
contract exerts individual effort since w′b ≥ ψ(1, 1) − ψ(0, 1). Contract w′ thus generates
nonnegative expected profit, and W ∗ cannot form a competitive equilibrium.
Second, consider a separating equilibrium W ∗ that does not contain at least one element of
W cc, or that the conditionally cooperative workers do not exert team effort in equilibrium.
Take any contract w′ ∈ W cc. As shown above, firms offer at least one contract w ∈ W s
for the selfish workers. The contracts in W cc then maximize the conditionally cooperative
workers’ utility in any separating equilibrium, thus uc
(
w′, eCEc (w′), eCEc (w′)
)
> u∗c . Consider
another contract w′′ which specifies the same bonus as contract w′ but pays out a fixed
wage that is lower by some ² > 0. Since the bonus is identical, contract w′′ implements
the same effort choices in the cooperative equilibrium as w′. Contract w′ generates at least
zero profit in case the contract is only accepted by conditionally cooperative workers who
coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium. Since ² > 0, the same holds for w′′. Further,
² can be chosen such that uc
(
w′′, eCEc (w′′), eCEc (w′′)
)
> u∗c > uc
(
w′′, eSEc (w′′),eSEc (w′′)
)
.
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Finally, the incentive constraint (12) implies that u∗s ≥ us
(
w′, eSEs , ·
)
and consequently
u∗s > us
(
w′′,eSEs (w′′), ·
)
. Lemma 4 then implies that W ∗ cannot form a competitive
equilibrium.
Third, selfish workers receive a contract from W s in any separating equilibrium. Conse-
quently, no contract w 6∈W s can yield selfish workers a utility as high as their equilibrium
utility without making losses. Equally, no contract w 6∈ W cc can yield conditionally
cooperative workers a utility as high as their equilibrium utility without making losses or
attracting selfish workers. Since all contracts w 6∈ W s ∪W cc are thus strictly dominated,
they cannot be element of W ∗. Thus, W ∗ ⊆W s ∪W cc.
Fourth, the set W ∗ need not contain all contracts in W s and W cc. To see this consider
any contract w′ ∈ W cc with w′ 6∈ W ∗. The incentive constraint (12) implies that
u∗s ≥ us
(
w′,eSEs (w′), ·
)
and u∗c = uc
(
w′,eCEc (w′),eCEc (w′)
)
since at least one contract in
W cc is already offered. Consequently, a∗θ(w
′,W ∗ ∪ w′) = 0 for both types θ ∈ {s, c} is in
line with our refinements. Yet a worker who is the only one accepting w′ cannot be matched
into a team and receives his outside option of zero. Since both types get a strictly positive
equilibrium utility, it is therefore optimal never to accept w′. The same argument holds for
all contracts in W s that are not offered in equilibrium.
Finally, Lemma 3 yields that contracts in W cc that attract only conditionally cooperative
workers who coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium make strictly positive profit unless
G ∈ [F − ψ(1, 1) + ψ(0, 1), F − ψ(1, 0)]. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
By construction, the separating equilibrium in Proposition 2 cannot be upset by a separating
contract that attracts only one type of workers. Therefore, consider a pooling contract
w′ /∈ W ∗ that might attract both types of workers. Since w′ is a pooling contract,
Refinement 1 cannot be applied to restrict beliefs. We have shown in the proof of Lemma
3 that u∗c ≥ u∗s. Further, conditionally cooperative workers get a weakly higher equilibrium
utility in the cooperative equilibrium as compared to the selfish equilibrium by the optimality
of their effort choice. There are three cases.
Case A) Suppose that the prior probability λ for a worker to be conditionally cooperative is
so low such that there only exists the selfish equilibrium given contractw′. Selfish workers are
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offered a contract from the setW s by Proposition 2. If contractw′ is not to generate expected
losses, u∗s ≥ us
(
w′, eSEs (w′), ·
)
must hold. Refinement 3 then allows for a∗s(w′,W
∗ ∪w′) = 0
such that selfish workers cannot be attracted. However, a contract that attracts only one
type of worker cannot upset the considered equilibrium.
Suppose for the remainder of this proof that the prior probability λ for a worker to be
conditionally cooperative is sufficiently high such that there exist both the selfish and the
cooperative equilibrium given contract w′.
Case B) Suppose that w′ can attract both types of workers no matter what equilibrium
workers expect to be played. Workers can then coordinate on the selfish equilibrium upon
accepting w′ without violating Refinement 2. By the same argument as in Case A) above,
contract w′ must then generate expected losses as otherwise it cannot attract the selfish
workers. Thus, contract w′ cannot upset the considered equilibrium.
Case C) Suppose thatw′ can attract conditionally cooperative workers only if they expect the
cooperative equilibrium to be played upon accepting w′. Suppose, however, workers believe
that only selfish workers accept w′. Given this belief, only the selfish equilibrium exists. If
workers expect the selfish equilibrium to be played, it is indeed optimal only for the selfish
workers to accept the newly offered contract. Thus, beliefs, effort choices, and acceptance
decisions are consistent. However, a contract that attracts only one type of worker cannot
upset the considered equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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